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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant Helen W.
Boyer, will be referred to herein as "Helen Boyer" or "Appellant Boyer55; the Boyer
appellees will be referred to herein as the "Boyer5' or "Appellee Boyer" and appellee
Dannie Green will be referred to herein as "Green55.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
DETERMINED THAT SURVEYOR GREEN WAS NOT AN
APPROPRIATE PARTY DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: An appellate court will review the
lower court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of
law under a correctness standard. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181
(Utah 1997). With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court will
review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal
effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and no deference need
be given a lower court's resolution of such questions of law. Id.
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Dannie B. Green's Motion To Dismiss or Alternatively, for Summary
Judgment (R. 205-205); Dannie B. Green's Memorandum In Support (R. 206-214);
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Memorandum In Opposition To Dannie B. Green's Motion To Dismiss Or Alternatively,
Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 221-237); Defendant's Memorandum Supporting
Motion To Dismiss Claims Against Dannie B. Green (R. 244-249); Dannie B. Green's
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Or, Alternatively, Summary
Judgment (R. 259-265); Transcript Of Motion Hearing Dated 02-06-06 (R. 634); Ruling
and Order (R. 284-299); Dannie B. Green's Motion For Clarification Of Ruling And
Order Dated 02-02-06 (R. 384-385); Memorandum In Support Of Dannie B. Green's
Motion For Clarification Of Ruling And Order Dated 02-07-06 (R. 386-389); Plaintiffs
Motion For Reconsideration Of The Court's 02-07-06 Ruling And Order (R. 390-392);
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Reconsideration Of The Court's 0206-07 Ruling And Order (R. 393-397); Defendants' Memorandum Re: Motion For
Clarification And Reconsideration (R. 405-407); Dannie B. Green's Memorandum In
Response To Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration Of The Court's 02-07-06 Ruling
And Order (R. 412-416); Memorandum In Response To Dannie B. Green's Motion For
Clarification Of Ruling And Order dated 02-07-06 (R. 489-491); and Ruling And Order
(R. 499-511).
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED
TO
DETERMINE
THE
PARTIES'
RIGHTS
AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH REMOVAL OF THE FENCE
DEFENDANTS PLACED ON PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY AND FURTHER
FAILED TO AWARD PLAINTIFF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES IN
THIS MATTER?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: The adequacy of damages is a question
of fact, and an appellate court will not overturn the trial court's findings unless they are
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clearly erroneous. In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996). Whether and the
extent to which attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness. Selvage v. J J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996). The appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney fees is
abuse of discretion. Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148 (Utah 2004). An appellate court will
review the lower court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its
conclusions of law under a correctness standard. See Drake v. Industrial Common, 939
P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, the

appellate court will review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard;
however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and
no deference need be given a lower court's resolution of such questions of law. Id.
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Second Amended Complaint (R. 192-199); Transcript Of Trial (Volumes IIII) (R. 635-637); Memorandum Of Law Re: Award Of Attorney Fees (R. 588-592);
Memorandum Decision (R. 593-619); Plaintiffs Response To Defendant Memorandum
Of Law Re: Award Of Attorney Fees (R. 620-622); Order And Judgment (R. 625-627);
and Notice Of Appeal (R. 628-629).
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the appeal or of central importance
to the appeal.
78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith-Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and
3

not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court;
or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions
of Subsection (1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below
The main issue in this case was the proper location of a fence which divided two
sections of land (designated herein as "Section 31" and "Section 32") situated in Summit
County. The Boyer Appellees in this matter tore down a fence located on the long
established section line between Section 31 and Section 32, and thereafter placed a new
fence on a line consistent with a survey ("Green Survey") completed by Green at
Appellee Boyer's request. Appellant filed suit asserting that Appellee Boyer had placed
the new fence on Appellant's property. Later, Appellant sought to add Green as a party
defendant in this matter on the basis that Green's Survey was negligently performed and
clouded plaintiffs title. After briefing and hearing, the trial court concluded Green was
not a proper party defendant in this case.
Following trial, the trial court determined that the original fenced section line was
the proper boundary line as opposed to the line established by Green. The trial court did
not, however, award plaintiff anything for the damages plaintiff sustained (including
costs and attorney fees) in relation to removal of the old fence and replacement of the
new fence, nor did the trial court determine the parties' rights and responsibilities in
connection with removal of the new fence. The trial court also declined make an awared
4

for damages sustained to Appellant's property. Consequently, plaintiff appealed the trial
court's conclusion that Green was not a proper party in the case as well as the trial court's
failure to award damages and attorney fees in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant agrees with the following Findings Of Fact entered by the trial court
herein:
1.

Joseph and Lois Boyer owned land in the Chalk Creek area of Summit

County, near Coalville. What has happened to their land since their death is the subject of
this dispute. Joseph died in 1967 and Lois died in 1971. They had several children:
Joseph LaVern (Vern), Lyle, William, Leah Nielson, (the only daughter), Edison (Ted)
and Fay Boyer. (R. 595)
2.

Tom Boyer, defendant, is the grandson of Joseph and Lois through Tom's

father Vern, who is the brother of Lyle Boyer, the deceased spouse of plaintiff. (R. 595)
3.

Tom Boyer received section 32 and Lyle Boyer received section 31 through

the chain of title to be described below. Just what those sections entailed and now entail
is at issue in this case. (R. 595)
4.

On October 3, 2003, Tom Boyer sold section 32 to defendant Fewkes, a

limited liability company, whose managing member is Tom's son Jeremy Boyer. In
November 2003 Fewkes conveyed approximately 6 acres to Jeremy Boyer. (R. 595-596)
5.

Plaintiff is the trustee of the Lyle and Helen Boyer Revocable Trust, and

the wife of Lyle Boyer, now deceased, and thus the aunt of Tom Boyer. (R. 596)
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6.

Plaintiff is the record title owner of section 31. Both sections 31 and 32 are

in Township 3 North, Range 6 East, SLB&M, U.S. Survey. (R. 596)
7.

Lyle Boyer acquired property through an executor's deed from the estate of

his parents, Joseph and Lois Boyer. That deed was executed by one of the co-executors,
William Boyer, another son of Joseph and Lois, on July 31, 1979, and that deed conveyed
a good deal of other land and included "Section 31, [listing township and range as above],
U.S. Survey, containing 623.6 acres, more or less," subject to the probate decree mineral
rights. Lyle Boyer then quit claimed that same property with the identical description as
to section 31 on June 14, 1988, to the trust named as plaintiff herein. (R. 596)
8.

Tom Boyer acquired section 32 from his father Vern Boyer. Also on July

31, 1979, William Boyer as co-executor executed an executor's deed conveying property
to Joseph LaVern Boyer, (Vern Boyer) and that included "Section 32 [naming the same
township and range] containing 640 acres, more or less." It thus differs from the
executor's deed concerning section 31 in that this section 32 executor's deed did not use
the words "U.S. Survey." It was also subject to mineral rights under the probate decree.
Vern Boyer by quit claim deed conveyed the same property, including the same
description as to Section 32, to Tom and Vern Boyer Land and Livestock, a Utah
partnership, on October 13, 1982. The Tom and Vern Boyer Land and Livestock
company executed a warranty deed on May 11, 1995, to Tom Boyer and his wife. That
property consisted of, among other property, Section 32 with the same description as the
deed by which it was acquired. Tom Boyer and his wife, by warranty deed executed
October 7, 2003, conveyed "All of Section 32 [same range and township] to Fewkes.
6

That deed did not contain any note as to acreage. As noted Fewkes conveyed a few acres
to Jeremy Boyer and is wife the next month in 2003. (R. 596-597)
9.

In the lifetime of Joseph and Lois Boyer sections 31 and 32 were fenced

around their perimeter, along with other sections not at issue in this case. However, there
was no fence between sections 31 and 32 during the lives of Joseph and Lois. A fence
was first erected between sections 31 and 32 in 1977 or 1978 as will be described below.
(R. 597)
10.

Long ago, at a date not revealed by the testimony, but evidently not long

after the deaths of Joseph and Lois, a dispute arose between Vern Boyer (and his son
Tom Boyer) and Lyle Boyer concerning the boundary between section 31 and section 32.
Tom Boyer thus commissioned a licensed surveyor, Fred Malan, who did a survey in
1976. Malan conducted that work on August 7 and 14, 1976. Tom Boyer accompanied
Fred Malan on those two days, as did Malan's son Kent, who was assisting his father.
Malan prepared a certified report a year later, in September 1977. That report indicated
that Malan located a rock with markings on the north boundary of the line between
sections 31 and 32. Section 32 lies east of section 31, and north of section 31 is section 30
owned by Judd and north of section 32 and east of section 30 is section 29. To the south
of section 31 lies section 6 and to the south of section 32 and to the east of section 6 lies
section 5, these sections 5 and 6 being in another township. Malan certified he made a
survey of the line between sections 31 and 32. The rock was noted as having 5 notches on
the east and one notch on the south. At one point the certification states the survey was
done for Fay and Tom Boyer, and at another that it was done for Vernon Boyer, Tom
7

Boyer and Fay Boyer. Between sections 29 and 30 there was a fence that was erected
before any of these events. The stone Malan indicated he found was at the intersection
between sections 31 and 32 where the fence between sections 30 and 29 touched the
northern edge of sections 31 and 32. The northern boundary of sections 31 and 32 was
also fenced long before these events to separate the sections north of sections 31 and 32.
(R. 597-598)
11.

Not long after the Malan survey, sometime in 1977 or 1978 [sic], Tom

Boyer erected a fence between sections 31 and 32. It was called by Tom Boyer a "stock"
fence and he stated it was only to keep out livestock, and he did not intend it to be the
boundary as he did not believe that was the proper boundary. That fence corresponded
with the Malan survey, and on the north boundary the fence began where the fence
between sections 30 and 29 ended on the south edge of those sections and the north edge
of sections 31 and 32. There was thus a "four way" fence corner at the intersections of
sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. The fence was approximately 400 feet east, into section 32, of
where Tom Boyer believed and continues to believe the boundary between section 31 and
32 should be. The fence went south and westerly, and was erected by Tom Boyer. (R.
598-599)
12.

That Malan plat was recorded by Vern Boyer, who recorded it October 9,

1980, along with an affidavit from Vern Boyer which stated that Malan located the
"corner section corner common to sections 31 and 32 . . . and sections 5 and 6 . . ."
Attached was a copy of the Malan survey dated September 1977. (R. 599)
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13.

Disputes still continued between Tom and Lyle Boyer as to the boundary.

Tom Boyer commissioned another survey in 1985 from Bing Christensen, also a licensed
surveyor. Christensen did a survey June 4, 1985, and prepared a drawing showing the
results, including stone monuments and fence corner posts he found and accepted as
evidence of the location of corresponding section corners. Christensen provided two
affidavits to that effect, one in October of an unknown year and one in October 2001.
That map shows a stone was located at the "fence corner" where sections 31 and 32 meet,
on the north edge. What was labeled as a "section comer stone" was found on the
southwest corner of section 31 and another section comer stone was located at the
southeast comer of section 32. A "fence comer" was labeled on the boundary of sections
31 and 32 at the south edge.
14.

Disputes continued and a meeting was held at the request of Tom Boyer at

the Summit County Courthouse in Coalville in October 1985. Present were Tom Boyer,
his lawyer Wendell Bennett, Lyle Boyer, Bing Christensen, Kent Wilde, Sam Lewis, who
leased section 31 from plaintiff, and Ron Baxter. Baxter and Wilde were surveyors Lyle
had hired in the past. The boundary between the sections was discussed and out of that
meeting further confusion arose. Some claim there was an agreement and some claim
there was not. The court finds that all agreed that the fence erected by Tom Boyer was the
correct boundary line that everyone would live with. Correspondence between Bennett,
representing Tom Boyer, and Lyle Boyer followed. Bennett stated to Lyle the temporary
fence was 400 feet too far to the east (into section 32) at the north end and 50 feet too far
east at the south end of section 32. Bennett enclosed the Christensen survey. Lyle Boyer
9

responded that he had tried to locate the section line between the two sections. Lyle
referred to receiving the Malan survey and it showed the fence built by Tom Boyer was
the true line. Lyle stated he believed the Christensen and Malan surveys both showed the
fence put up by Tom Boyer in about 1977-78 was in the right place. Lyle agreed to
maintain the southern half and Tom would maintain the northern half of that fence, as
Bennett had proposed. After the October 1985 meeting Bennett again wrote Lyle and
stated concerning the fence Tom built in 1977-78 that "we have now agreed to recognize
as the boundary line between sections 31 and 32 until such a time as the government
authority charged with the responsibility . . . reestablishes those corner markers as
between sections 31 and 32 . . . Until [a further government survey occurs] we agreed to
honor the fence line as described in the enclose document, which was established by Bing
Christensen . . . [and which was agreed to by Kent Wilde.]" The Bennett letter attached a
description that was based somewhat on the Christensen survey, but it did not exactly
trace that map, but began at the southwest corner of section 31, then north along a fence,
then east 5288 feet to the four-comer fence line made between sections 29, 30, 31, and
32. Lyle Boyer wrote back in early 1986 and stated the existing fence could stay where it
was located and he would maintain the southern half and Tom the northern half. Bennett
in June 1986 asked Lyle to sign the agreement and that was never done. From all of this
the court finds that there was an agreement but Tom Boyer was not happy or satisfied
about it. No written agreement was ever executed and that agreement has no legal
significance but informs the court as to credibility issues.
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15.

Because of the continuing disagreement, Tom Boyer commissioned yet

another survey, by Green or Alta Surveying, in 2003. Green's survey, working for ALTA
Survey, formed the basis of later action by Tom Boyer. Green's survey indicated the
boundary between sections 31 and 32 was approximately 420 feet west, or into section
31, of where Malan and Christensen had placed the northern boundary. That is, the fence
running between sections 29 and 30, where it touched the northern boundary of sections
31 and 32, was incorrect, and the true boundary was west 420 at the north end and about
50 west at the southern end. If the line was where Tom erected the fence in 1977 a spring
at the southern end of the properties was partly in section 31 and partly in section 32. If
the Green survey is correct, and the newly erected 2003 fence reflects the true boundary,
that spring is entirely within section 32. Water rights are not at issue in this case.
Based on the Green survey, Tom Boyer removed the fence he had erected in 197778 and erected a new fence along the line shown as the boundary by Green, that is, about
420 feet to the west, at the north end, of where the old fence was and about 50 feet to the
west on the southern boundary of the two sections at issue. When removing the 1977-78
fence its remnants were stored all on section 32, not on section 31.
16.

Green obtained his surveyor's license in 2000. He explained why he

disagreed with the other surveys. The court realizes its function in this case but the idea
that the court can determine, on the basis of a short trial, what surveying principles were
violated and what were followed is rather unrealistic. To the court all surveyors who
testified seemed to be sincere and capable. It is apparent that surveying is not "rocket
science" in that there is only one correct answer, but there is some disagreement even
11

amongst experienced surveyors. Various notes from the past may be interpreted
differently, various landmarks may change, and not all surveys are completely "true" and
some are better than others, just as in any endeavor. Green explained his procedures and
the reasons for his results. He opined that the common corner of sections 29, 30, 31, and
32 is where it is shown on plaintiffs exhibit 9. That is, favoring defendants, or about 420
feet west at the north boundary of where plaintiff claims the boundary is. Green
explained his understanding of the 1973 Manual of Surveying Instructions published by
the U.S. Department of the Interior. Green explained that he considered the previous
surveys, but also what are called the topographic calls, the original field notes from the
1874 U.S. Survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic map, the acreage
involved, as well as other factors. He concluded that the 1977-78 fence was not the
boundary line but the boundary line is where the 2003 fence was erected by Tom Boyer
after the Green survey. The original plat of 1874 shows section 31 is "short" and consists
of 623.6 acres and section 32 consists of 640 acres.
Green had done another survey in the area, for a person named Henrie, in 2001.
Henrie was interested in purchasing section 28 and some of section 33, and so Green
obtained documents and information from neighboring land owners, including Tom
Boyer, to conduct that survey. Green also obtained a title company title report which was
suppose to contain the public documents. Later in 2003, after Tom Boyer heard of Green
and his 2001 survey, Tom Boyer asked Green to establish the boundary between sections
31 and 32. Green later concluded, after talking to some of the surveyors of plaintiff, that
they were wrong and he was right. Green opined that plaintiffs surveyors had simply
12

accepted the "stone" they found without "testing" it against other information, as Green
did. Thus, Green opined as he did.
Green filed a survey for Henrie, and it varies in some regards from the Tom Boyer
survey of 2003, which was filed in 2004 with the recorder. (There is no Summit County
surveyor, so surveys are filed with the county recorder.) Green explained the 2001 Henrie
survey was not "wrong" but was accurate based on the information, and with the later
filing of the 2003 survey, any interested person could see what Green had done because
of his narrative description on those two surveys. A great deal of testimony was elicited
about the 2001 survey.
17.

Various persons had been to the disputed area over the years. Many had

seen, and the court finds, that indeed there was a government "stone" or monument
placed there by the 1874 survey, which was intended as the common corner between
sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. That was not shown on the 1967 or 1997 topographic map,
but various individuals who were not interested directly in the dispute saw the stone. That
stone would not show up on a government topographic map unless it was observed by a
government employee tasked to find such markers. The Mai an survey described the stone
and his son Kent testified he saw it. The Christensen survey noted a stone at the same
location. Wilde himself had seen it several times and it was notched and marked as a
government-placed stone. Wilde saw it in 1977 and again in 1985, but it was not there in
2003. Wilde and Lyle Boyer had been to the corner with a view to staking a fence line
south of that boundary. Lyle hired a contractor, Hortin, to "push" or clear the path for a
fence. Hortin saw and described the stone, as did a neighbor who maintained the fences
13

of another section that adjoined the comer of 29, 20, 31, and 32. Those persons all
described the stone a bit differently but as being in the same location as the four corner
fence area, where the 1977-78 fence was erected going south. Tom Boyer testified he did
not see such a stone ever, nor did his son Jeremy. Tom went to the site with Malan,
Christensen, and at other times. The court credits the testimony of Wilde and others more
than Tom Boyer concerning this government stone and its location. The description of the
stone convinces the court not that they are wrong, but that they are being honest. The
court does not indicate or imply Tom Boyer caused the removal of the stone, but the
court credits the testimony of the many persons who saw the stone at the point where the
Malan and Christensen surveys indicate it was. That is, where the fence line coming from
the north between sections 29 and 30 joins the northern boundary of sections 31 and 32,
or where the 1977-78 fence was erected by Tom Boyer.
18.

The court finds from its own common sense as well as the expert testimony

elicited, that the field notes from 1874 were not completely accurate as to what are called
the topographic calls. The topographic map shows, for example, a ridge or gulch or
stream, and the field notes from 1874 indicate those were in different places from what
the topographic map shows. The survey's field notes from 1874 would say, for example,
that from point A it was "X chains (converted into feet and inches) to a "ridge." Of course
just where a ridge begins and ends is hard to determine, and that is obviously true of a
gulch, a stream, or tree line. Those latter two features can and obviously may well change
in 130 years from 1874 to 2003. The notes, again, show reference to a line of trees, or a
gulch, or ridge, or stream, and of course natural changes occur in those over 130 years.
14

The notes are found by the court to be inaccurate as to distances and thus the corners
which were established by following those notes as Green did were inaccurate. Often the
distances were off as much as 500 feet, which would and does account for the
discrepancy Green states he found. Because the field notes were incorrect as plaintiffs
expert opined, Green's reliance on them caused his final conclusion to be incorrect.
19.

Appellant disagrees with the factual findings set forth in Paragraph 19 of

the trial court's Findings Of Fact.
ADDITIONAL FACTS SET FORTH BY APPELLANT:
20.

The trial court concluded that Green's Survey was not correct and found the

true boundary line between Sections 31 and 32 at the north end of those sections as
shown on the Malan and Chritensen surveys and where the 1977-78 fence was erected.
The trial court, in Paragraph 8 of its Conclusions Of Law, states as follows:
Plaintiff has shown title to the land up to the boundary as found
herein. Thus, plaintiffs causes of action for tortious conduct has been
shown, but no damages have been proven. The court declares the boundary
between sections 31 and 32 to be as herein described and quiets title
accordingly. The fence should be moved as indicated below. No damages
are awarded and of course no punitive damages.
(R. 616)
21.

Following the entry of the trial court's judgment, plaintiff timely filed her

Notice Of Appeal. (R. 628-629)
22.

Tom Boyer was aware of other survey work that had been completed in

relation to the government stone prior to the time he moved the 1977-78 fence and that
others recollected seeing the stone. (R. 635 at 107:9-108:6)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed Green as a party
defendant in this matter. There remained questions of material fact in relation to the
duties and obligations Green owed to Appellant and therefore dismissal of Green was
improper. The trial court also failed to award Appellant damages for the losses she
sustained as a result of Appellee Boyer's actions and further failed to award Appellant
costs and attorney fees associated with this action.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The Trial Court Erred When It Dismissed Dannie B. Green
As A Defendant In This Matter
Appellant contends the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it dismissed
Green as a party defendant in this case. Notwithstanding that Green was dismissed as a
party in the case (and consequently Appellant did not have a full opportunity to develop a
case against Green) the trial court made several findings and conclusions in relation to
Green.

Appellant asserted Green breached his professional duties when he filed an

inaccurate survey thereby clouding Appellant's title to her property.
In relation to this issue, the trial court stated in relevant part as follows:
As to the negligence claim of the third cause of action, the court
again determines this claim under the summary judgment standard. The
court believes that there are factual disputes about the nature of the survey,
whether it is correct or not, and both parties agree there are disputes about
the nature of the survey. As in any negligence claim, it is a rare case where
summary judgment is proper. However, if there is no legal duty, factual
disputes about whether there has been a breach of the duty are not
important.
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Green asserts the court can and should determine as a matter of law
that there was no duty owed to plaintiff and thus there can be no negligence
as a matter of law, whatever the merits of the dispute about the validity of
the survey.
The court agrees with Green that it can and should determine if there
is a duty owed as a matter of law. The court, as a matter of public policy,
determines there is not a duty owed by a surveyor such that a tort of
negligence will lie whenever a property owner claims the survey is
incorrect under circumstances such as this case. If any adjoining owner
could claim negligence against a surveyor who disagrees with other
surveyors, there would be no reason whatever that defendant Boyer could
not file a negligence claim again Kent Wilde or others who performed a
previous survey.
The court understands the concerns of plaintiff and expresses some
sympathy for the situation and believes it is a close and interesting
question. If a surveyor can file whatever survey plat he desires, without
regard to its correctness (plaintiffs allegation herein, and the court is not
stating that is what happened here) there ought to be a duty to adjoining
land owners to make sure the survey is correct. This case shows the need,
plaintiff asserts, as a policy matter, for such a duty. Had plaintiff desired to
sell the property, the recorded plat, with the alleged incorrect boundary line,
clearly causes possible damage to plaintiff. She cannot sell the property
under the disputed boundary. The filing of the plat, though not subject to a
claim of wrongful lien, certainly operates as an encumbrance on the
property which adjoins the property Green was hired to survey. The court
understands plaintiffs position that if certain acts were done or omitted,
recovery should occur as there is a duty to neighboring landowners whose
interest is affected by a survey. The court acknowledges that the survey
could and has affected plaintiff, and an incorrect survey could obviously
affect any neighboring land owners, and any survey which purports to
"give" land from one section to another clearly impacts more than the
contracting parties to the survey. A loss of value of property is certainly an
injury that, if caused by negligence, should be compensable.
However, on balance, as a matter of public policy, where there are
allegations in this second amended complaint that will allow the court to
determine the "correctness" of the various surveys that have been
performed, plaintiff is not without a remedy. She is without a remedy
against Green, or any other surveyor whose product disagrees with the
product of other surveyors, but she is not without a remedy.
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If the courts were to allow, under the circumstances of this case,
such a negligence claim to stand, defendant Boyer could file a negligence
claim against any and all other surveyors who disagreed with the survey he
commissioned, claiming they were negligently performed and contain
incorrect information which over the years has caused damage to Boyer, as
"taking" his property and being an improper encumbrance on his property.
Boyer could claim he could have sold property belonging to him had he
know the "true" acreage. While in this case plaintiff claims Green was
incorrect, Boyer could then, if the court allowed this cause of action to
remain, file an action against other surveyors and claim their filings were
negligently performed.
In this case, each surveyor will presumably testify, and the court will
make finding as to the "correct" boundary line, and issue declaratory
judgment as to whether the boundary is where Green says it is or whether it
is somewhere else, where other surveyors say it is. That does not mean that
each surveyor should be liable if their work is incorrect, especially in this
situation where there are remedies to find the "correct" boundary.
Allowing negligence suits in such situations as this would create havoc.
In other cases a negligence claim may lie against a surveyor, such as
a case where a plat is filed by a surveyor and many people rely on its result
to purchase land or otherwise rely on its incorrect information and can
show damages as a result. Here, where there are competing surveys over a
boundary line, there is no duty of a surveyor that is owed to one such as
plaintiff, an adjoining landowner.
Whether there was a breach of any professional duty remains to be
determined at trial in the ultimate determination of the "correct" boundary,
but the result will be a declaration of the boundary line and if plaintiff
prevails, damages against defendant Boyer could be assessed. There should
be no claim against Green for his survey or his filing of the plat.
Thus, the court concludes there is no duty owed and so no
negligence could be shown. Whether treated as a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, the result is the same. There is no legal
principle which allows recovery against Green. There is no factual dispute
that alters the legal conclusions of the court as to duty owed.
(R. 292-297)
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Contrary to the trial court's public policy position, Utah case law has established,
"It is clear that in the practice of his profession, a surveyor may be found liable in
damages resulting from his mistake or misrepresentation in the survey of realty, where he
does not perform his duties with a reasonable degree of care and skill." Bushnell v.
Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976). In Bushnell, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where contractual relations never existed between the plaintiff and
the surveyor the question has arisen as to the applicability of the general
rule that no cause of action in tort can arise from the breach of a duty
existing by virtue of contact unless privity of contract existed between the
defendant and the person injured. While the rule has sometimes been
applied so as to relieve a surveyor from liability, it has also been held that
the lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a
defense in a tort action, (emphasis added)

The Bushnell court then referred to Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) which is a
case where recovery was allowed in the absence of a direct contractual relationship. In
Ronzy, the court noted:
Under these circumstances it seems to us the fortuitous circumstance
that the ultimate loss resulting from the faulty survey fell upon one other
than the person for whom the survey was made should not absolve
defendant from responding in damages. The situation is not one fraught
with such an overwhelming potential liability as to dictate a contrary result,
for the class of persons who might forseeably use this plat is rather
narrowly limited, if not exclusively so, to those who deal with the surveyed
property as purchasers or lenders. Injury will ordinarily occur only once
and to the person owning the lot.
The Ronzy court also focused on the undesirability of requiring an innocent party
to carry the burden of a surveyor's professional mistake, and the fact that recovery by a
user whose ultimate use was foreseeable would promote cautionary techniques among
surveyors. By applying the Ronzy reasoning to the instant case, Green performed a
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survey which encumbered Appellant's property. As was true in Ronzy, the ultimate loss
from the faulty survey fell upon Appellant (an innocent party), and as such, should not
absolve Green from responding in damages. Moreover, holding a wrongdoer such as
Green liable for his conduct would likely foster more professionalism and thoroughness
in the completion of surveys and would likely lessen rather the increase litigation.
Other jurisdictions have taken a similar position. In Hutchinson v. Dubeau, 298
S.E.2d 4 (1982), the Georgia Court Of Appeals stated, "There is authority under general
tort principles for holding a professional surveyor liable to third persons with whom he is
not in privity for negligent misrepresentations appearing in a plat, provided that the
surveyor knew or should have known that such third persons would use and rely upon the
plat in subsequent transactions involving the property." Here, any prospective purchasers
or lenders interested in Appellant's property would reasonably and forseeably rely on the
Green Survey.

As the trial court admitted, the Green Survey not only encumbered

Appellant's property, but the trial court's decision indicates Green's Survey decreased the
size (and as a consequence thereof, the value) of Appellant's property. Consequently,
plaintiff is entitled to be awarded the remedies she seeks herein.
In Kent v. Bartlett, 122 Cal. Rapt. 615; 49 Cal. App. 3d 724 (1975), the plaintiffs
brought an action to recover damages against the defendant allegedly caused by
defendant's negligence in making a survey of certain real property. The California court
also cited Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), a leading case dealing with the right of
a plaintiff to recover damages for the defendant's negligent performance of a contract
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with a third party. The Biakanja court laid down the following guidelines to be followed
in such cases:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of public policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability
of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm.
The Kent court noted that the defendant therein had made some attempts to
contend that he was not negligent in making the survey and that the damages sustained by
the plaintiff were not the proximate result of any negligence on the part of the defendant.
In this regard, the court stated that these issues were factual in nature and should have
been resolved by the jury.
The Biakanja factors are clearly applicable to the instant case. While Appellant
did not directly contract with Green concerning the survey, the Green Survey was
certainly intended to and has in fact adversely affect the portion of Appellant's property
that was involved in the attempted change of the boundary line. Additionally, it was
entirely foreseeable that an inaccurate survey could cause Appellant harm. The Green
Survey has in fact encumbered Appellant's property and the encumbrance is a direct
result of its having been improvidently filed. Finally, Green is morally responsible in any
event for his errors, and his answering in damages may prevent future similar conduct by
other surveyors.
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As a result of the inaccurate survey, Appellant was placed in a difficult and
unenviable position. Appellant's property was encumbered and she was subject to both
diminished value and acreage as a result of the Green Survey having been filed. Green
refused to amend or otherwise correct the inaccuracies. Yet, the trial court found that
Green has no duty to Appellant. For this Court to so hold would preclude Appellant (and
other similarly situated parties) from seeking any meaningful redress for the damage they
have suffered as a proximate consequence of a surveyor's breach of professional
obligations and misconduct.
The nature and extent of the affirmative duties that are owed by experienced and
licensed professionals such as Green to members of the public such as plaintiff who have
no contractual relationship with them is stated as follows in West v. Inter-Financial Inc.,
139 P.3d 1059 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) where this Court held that a real estate agent as a
licensed professional could be held liable for damages suffered by a third-party member
of the public who relied upon the real estate agent's appraisal:
Real estate appraisers, like real estate brokers and real estate agents,
have a "statutory duty to the public" and are expected to be "honest,
ethical, and competent. "Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^[22 (quoting
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)). Real estate
appraisers are similarly "licensed person[s] or entities] who hold[]
[themselves] out to the public as having particular skills and
knowledge in the real estate field." Id. At ^|20 (quoting Secor v.
Knight, 716 P. 2d 790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986) (additional citations
omitted)).
Green's conduct of which plaintiff complained of herein consisted of two parts,
i.e. first, his negligent survey, and second, his willful recordation of his survey in willful
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disregard of the consequence such recordation would obviously have upon Appellant's
record title to Section 31. Such conduct should have rendered Green liable for
Appellant's damages and imposed a further affirmative duty upon him to amend his filed
survey to remove it as an encumbrance upon Appellant's title. The trial court precluded
Appellant's ability to seek redress from Green's improper actions.
Point II
Appellant Is Entitled To Recover The Damages Sustained To Appellant's Property.
Paragraph 19 of the trial court's Findings Of Fact states:
The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was not
persuasive. The cost to resurvey was not shown, and based on plaintiffs
position the court cannot see why another survey would have been helpful
or would now be helpful. The evidence as to the cost to tear down the 2003
fence was some indication of damages, but the cost to erect a range fence
was not compelling such that the court can find those costs are any measure
of damages. It was not shown why any new clearing must take place, as
when the 1977-78 fence was taken down in 2003, there still remains, as
shown by photographs, are area somewhat clear where a new fence could
be erected. That 1977-78 fence line is not overgrown such that any
estimate concerning clearing it again would be accurate. The bids to again
"clear" that already reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic. As
to the alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees or
other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what was removed
when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees were moved, but
there was no sufficient evidence as to how many nor the value of those.
Moreover, it was not shown why indeed concerning this range land there
needs to be any remediation as over the many years this land has been in
the Boyer family there has never been any such reforesting or replanting of
grasses. The damages must be proven, though of course they need not be
with specificity. They may not be the subject of conjecture, and the court
believes the estimates provided are just that—conjecture. The costs for
halting erosion or the spread of weeds appears to be the subject of
government regulation, but it was not shown that moving the 2003 fence
back to the 1977-78 fence location would cause any erosion or weed
problems that must be budgeted for 10 years. Moreover, this being
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rangeland it is not clear to the court that any such costs are legitimate in any
fashion.
(R. 607-608)
Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions Of Law states:
Plaintiff has not proven damages as claimed. The cost of removing
the fence erected in 2003 was not shown convincingly, nor was any need
for remediation shown convincingly. The evidence presented was too
speculative and not based on sufficient foundation such that it convinces
the court that there needs to be any erosion or weed control, or that a range
fence or any other fence would cost anywhere near what plaintiffs
evidence showed. The court rejects all the testimony about damages and
concludes that plaintiff has not proven any damages resulting from the
removal of the 1977-78 fence or the erection of the 2003 fence.
(R. 615-616)
During the period this appeal has been pending, appellee Boyer has removed the
2003 fence and placed it along the original 1977-78 fence line.

Consequently, the

damages Appellant was seeking to remove the 2003 fence is now moot. Appellant does
contend, however, that the trial court committed error when it failed to award the
damages which Appellee Boyer caused to Appellant's property.
The trial court's findings clearly indicate that trees were removed from
Appellant's property. In Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah.2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (Utah 1967), the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "When property has been damaged or destroyed by a
wrongful act, the desired objective is to ascertain as accurately as possible the amount of
money that will fairly and adequately compensate the owner for his loss." The Brereton
court found that it is proper to consider the value of the trees and award the damaged
party the amount of damages as would fairly and reasonably compensate him for being
deprived of the growing trees for the purposes he intended to use them. Id.
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InAult v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court found where
trees are negligently destroyed, the owner is entitled to recover either the difference in the
value of the land before and after the destruction of the trees, or the value of the trees
ascertainable separately from the land, whichever will best serve the objective of giving
the owner reasonable and adequate compensation for his actual loss as related to his use
of the property. (See also, Henderson v. For-Shor Company, 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) "Generally, the measure of damages for tortious injury to real property is the
difference between the value of the property immediately before and immediately after
the injury. An alternative measure is the cost of restoration, provided that restoration
costs do not exceed the diminution in value.")
The trial court in this case, however, neither awarded damages for the frees that
were admittedly removed from Appellant's property nor awarded damages to restore
Appellant's property to the condition that existed prior to the 2003 fence being placed on
the property. Such conduct was error.
The Henderson decision states, "In circumstances where no substantial damages
result and none are proved, the law will infer nominal damages for the authorized entry
onto the real property of another." Given the factual finding that trees were removed and
Appellant's property was disturbed, the trial court should have determined the reasonable
amount required to restore Appellant's property and awarded that amount as damages.
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Point HI
The Court Should Have Awarded Appellant Costs And Attorney Fees
Appellant incurred a substantial amount of costs and attorney fees in successfully
bringing this action against Appellees. In general, Utah follows the traditional American
rule that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or
contract authorizes such an award. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 885 P.2d 759,
782 (Utah 1994). "However, in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a
court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it
appropriate in the interests] of justice and equity." Id.

This power is "part of the

original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation." Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'I Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939));
Stewart 885 P.2d at 782; see also Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164-67 (reviewing the history of
equitable powers).
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 states in relevant part:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith....
In paragraph 6 of the trial court's Conclusions Of Law, the trial court states:
The claim of bad faith as to Green has been fully rejected. The
claim of bad faith as to Tom Boyer is harder to resolve. Certainly Tom
Boyer would argue that he acted, in talcing down the 1977-79 fence and
erecting the 2003 fence, that he acted on the basis of a legitimately
commissioned survey. That is certainly true. However, the pause the court
engages in is to ask itself why Tom Boyer felt the need to commission the
2003 survey. He had asked Malan and Christensen to do a survey and they
did so, each certifying the boundary line at a place where plaintiff claims it
to be. He agreed to others that was the situation in the October 1985
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meeting. He still could not seem to leave it, however, for some reason, and
so had still another survey conduct work. That is the difficult point the
court struggles with, why, based on what, did Tom Boyer even commission
Green. Tom Boyer, after having the Green survey, did not even approach
his aunt, plaintiff, an elderly woman, and explain what he was doing or
why. He merely acted and moved a fence. It certainly is unexplainable to
the court why someone would so behave. Whatever past disputes had
existed between Vern and Lyle could have and should have been forgotten
long ago. Both were deceased. Tom Boyer, for whatever reason, continued
to press the matter and asked for yet another survey. If such conduct is not
in bad faith, it is certainly mystifying to the court. Tom Boyer seemed,
however, to the court to be a sensible person in other areas of his life.
Based on a consideration of all factors, many no doubt unknown to the
court, the court cannot find his actions in bad faith.
(R. 616-617)
In this matter, although Tom Boyer placed the 1977-78 fence and agreed at the
courthouse meeting that the fence had been properly located, he caused the 1977-78 fence
to be moved to a new boundary line despite having previous surveys conducted and
agreeing to the 1977-78 fence line in 1985. He was well aware that others had viewed
the stone at the corner of the 1977-78 fence. Certainly such conduct in moving the fence
under these circumstances is bad faith. Given that the trial court made a close call on the
bad faith issue, and given that Appellant and an elderly woman in her 805s had no choice
but to pursue litigation to remedy the situation, the Appellant should be awarded her costs
and attorney fees in the interest of justice and equity, under Stewart, supra and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56, or both.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the judgment
that Green was not a proper party defendant in this case as well as the judgment that
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plaintiff is not entitled to recover the damages associated with restoring her property to its
condition prior to the tortious conduct of the Boyer Appellees. The trial court should also
be ordered to award plaintiff her costs and attorney fees incurred in re-establishing the
boundary line in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7

day of August, 2007.

Anthony R. Martineau^
Brett D. Cragun
Attorney For Plaintiff/Appellant

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant
was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to
said individuals at the following address this ]_ l_ day of August, 2007.
Robert H. Wilde
935 E. South Union Avenue
Suite D-102
Midvale,UT 84047
John Braithwaite
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN W. BOYER, TRUSTEE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040500429
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
THOMAS VERN BOYER and FEWKE.S
CANYON, LLC,
Defendants,

DATE: October,4, 2006

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
September 27, 28 and 29, 2006. Plaintiff was present with Ray G.
Martineau and Brett D. Cragun and defendants were present with
and through Robert H. Wilde.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 26, 2004. A second amended
complaint :was filed August 4, 2005.
The .second 'amended, complaint alleged plaintiff was the . .
trustee''-6fvt:he L.E. and Helen W.. Boyer Revocable Trust.

It

allegeo 1:\ s ;:r: -:.y that plaintiff 'and her predecessors are titJe
holders cf

Sec . _tn 31;y "Township 3 North, Range 6 East, * Salt Lake

Base and Meridian, according to an 1874 U.S. "ur^ey.
are legai;;tit:le holders to Section 32.

Defendants

For more than twenty

years-:the owners agreec * .tat a common true ?tunoait v.r: miked ty
a fence erected in 1977 or 1978,. In July 2003, tet?tcc:t tiot cti
* .,r recognized tence and erected a new tence inside tne eastern ,

;0,.00:5

boundary of Section 31.
The second amended complaint alleges (1) tortous (sic)
misconduct by defendant Boyer, (2) seeks removal of the new fence
and erection of the former fence, and m

cause four (claim three

against Green has been dismissed) seeks a declaratory judgment
that the old fence was and is the true boundary line and (5)
seeks punitive damages based on the wilful nature of the conduct.
The court has made several rulings in the case.

On February

7, 2006, the court dismissed the case against defendant Green, a
surveyor hired by defendants. The claims against him were
essentially that his 2003 survey, upon which defendants' relied
in removing the old fence and erecting the new fence, was faulty
and without foundation and m

violation of survey standards.

On July 26, 2006, the court denied the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment, ruling factual questions existed as
to the boundary and the court reaffirmed the dismissal of Green.

Thus, the issue m

this case is the location of a common

boundary between two sections, section 31 owned by plaintiff and
section 32 owned by defendant Fewkes, formerly owned by defendant
Tom Boyer.

A.t t^e tnd of plaintiff's case defendants moved jnde. Fu-~
41(b) r_i a dismissal.

The court reserved on the motion and
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addresses it herein in these findings.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Joseph and Lois Boyer owned land in the Chalk Creek area
of Summit County, near Coalville.

What has happened to their

land since their death is the subject of this dispute. Joseph
died m

1967 and Lois died m

1971.

They had several children:

Joseph LaVern (Vern), Lyle, William, Leah Nielson, ithe only
daughter), Edison (Ted) and Fay Boyer.
2. Tom Boyer, defendant, is the grandson of Joseph and Lois
through Tom's father Vern, who is the brother of Lyle Boyer, the
deceased spouse of plaintiff.
3. Tom Boyer received section 32 and Lyle Boyer received
section 31 through the chain of title to be described below.
rions entailed and now entail is at issue in

, _

, Tom Boyer sold section 32 to

limited liability company, whose managing

member is Tom^s son Jeremy Boyer.

In November 2003 Fewkes

conveyed approximately 6 acres to Jeremy Boyer.
5. Plaintiff is the trustee of the Lyle and Helen Boyer
Revocable Trust, and the wife of Lyle Boyer, now deceased, and
thus the aunt of Tom Boyer.
6. Plaintiff is the record title owner of section 31. Both
sections 31 and 32 are in Township 3 North, Range 6 East, SLB&M,
U.S. Survey.
7. Lyle Boyer acquired property through an executor's deed
from the estate of his parents, Joseph and Lois Boyer. That deed
was executed by one of the co-executors, William Boyer, another
son of Joseph and Lois, on July 31, 1979, and that deed conveyed
a good deal of other land and included "Section 31, [listing
township and range as above], U.S. Survey, containing 623.6
acres, more or less," subject to the probate decree mineral
rights.

Lyle Boyer then quit claimed that same property with the

identical description as to section 31 on June 14, 1988, to the
trust named as plaintiff herein.
8. Tom Boyer acquired section 32 from his father Vern Boyer.
Also on July 31, 1979, William Boyer as co-executor executed an
executor's deed conveying property to Joseph LaVern Boyer, (Vern
Boyer) and that included "Section 32 [naming the same township
and range] containing 640 acrec, more or 1 ss." It thas a itprs
from the executor's deed concerning section 31 ^n that
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section 32 executor''s deed did not use the words "U.S. Survey."
It was also subject to mineral rights under the probate decree.
Vern Boyer by quit claim deed conveyed the same property,
including the same description as to Section 32, to Tom and Vern
Boyer Land and Livestock, a Utah partnership, on October 13,
1982.

The Tom and Vern Boyer Land and Livestock company executed

a warranty deed on May 11, 1995, to Tom Boyer and his wife.

That

property consisted of, among other property, Section 32 with the
same description as the deed by which it was acquired.

Tom Boyer

and his wife, by warranty deed executed October 7, 2003, conveyed
"All of Section 32 [same range and township] to Fewkes.

That

deed did not contain any note as to acreage. As noted Fewkes
conveyed a few acres to Jeremy Boyer and is wife the next month
in 2003.
9. In the lifetime of Joseph and Lois Boyer sections 31 and
32 were fenced around their perimeter, along with other sections
not:.-at issue in this case.

However, there was no fence between

sections "31 and 32" during the' i-±v'es/:oi

' Joseph

and Lois.. A. fence

was firs:: erected between sections 31 and 32 in 1977 or 1978 as
will be"'described below.
10. Long r.cr\ ai a date not revealed by the testimony, but
evidently not long after'the.;'deaths of Joseph- and-Lois/ -%a dispute
rrose between ""---

vand

his son -Tom Boyer) and Lyle Boyer

-concerning 'the ' boundary between, section.31 and .section 32. ~"'^

Boyer thus commissioned a licensed surveyor, Fred Malan, who did
a survey in 1976.
1976.

Malan conducted that work on August 7 and 14,

Tom Boyer accompanied Fred Malan on those two days, as did

Malan's son Kent, who was assisting his father.

Malan prepared a

certified report a year later, in September 1977.

That report

indicated that Malan located a rock with markings on the north
boundary of the line between sections 31 and 32.

Section 32 lies

east of section 31, and north of section 31 is section 30 owned
by Judd and north of section 32 and east of section 30 is section
29.

To the south of section 31 lies section 6 and to the south

of section 32 and to the east of section 6 lies section 5, these
sections 5 and 6 being in another township. Malan certified he
made a survey of the line between sections 31 and 32. The rock
was noted as having 5 notches on the east and one notch on the
south. At one point the certification states the survey was done
for Fay and Tom Boyer, and at another that it was done for Vernon
Boyer, Tom Boyer and Fay Bover.

Between sections 29 and 30 there

was a fence that was erected before any of these events.

The

stone Malan indicated he found was at the intersection between
sections 31 and 32 where the fence between sections 30 and 29
touched the northern edge of sections 31 and 32.

The northern

boundary of sections 31 and 32 was also fenced long before these
events to separate the sections noith of sections
11. Not long after the Maid
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1 and 32.

survey, sometime m

l-*7/ or

1987, Tom Boyer erected a fence between sections 31 and 32.

It

was called by Tom Boyer a "stock" fence and he stated it was only
to keep out livestock, and he did not intend it to be the
boundary as he did not believe that was the proper boundary;
That fence corresponded with the Malan survey, and on the north
boundary the fence began where the fence between sections 30 and
29 ended on the south edge of those sections and the north edge
of sections 31 and 32. There was thus a "four way" fence corner
at the intersections of sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. The fence
was approximately 400 feet east, into section 32, of where Tom
Boyer believed and continues to believe the boundary between
section 31 and 32 should be.

The fence went south and westerly,

and was erected by Tom Boyer.
12. That Malan plat was recorded by Vern Boyer, who recorded
it October 9, 1980, along witn an affidavit frcm Vern Boyer which
stated that Malan located the "corner section corner common to
sections 31 and 32 . . .and sections 5 and 6 . . ."

Attached was

a copy of"the Malan survey dated September'1977.
13. Dispu7^ -7'11 continued between Tom and Lyle Boyer as
to the boundary. Tom Boyer commissioned another survey'-in 1-9.85
frcm ring Christeiisen, also a licensed surveyor. Christensen sid
a survey*-June A'r i'9'8 5, and- prepared ;a' drawing showing;.:the.: 7
results r -including stone monuments and fence corner'posts he
found' arid accepted as evidence* of the location of coxresponding

section corners.
effect, one m
2001.

Christensen provided two affidavits to that

October of an unknown year and one in October

That map shows a stone was located at the "fence corner"

where sections 31 and 32 meet, on the north edge.

What was

labeled as a "section corner stone" was found on the southwest
corner of section 31 and another section corner stone was located
at the southeast corner of section 32.

A "fence corner" was

labeled on the boundary of sections 31 and 32 at the south edge.
14. Disputes continued and a meeting was held at the request
of Tom Boyer at the Summit County Courthouse in Coalville in
October 1985.

Present were Tom Boyer, his lawyer Wendell

Bennett, Lyle Boyer, Bing Christensen, Kent Wilde, Sam Lewis, who
leased section 31 from plaintiff, and Ron Baxter. Baxter and
Wilde were surveyors Lyle had hired in the past. The boundary
between the sections was discussed and out of that meeting
further confusion arose.
some claim there was not.

Some claim there was an agreement and
The court finds that all agreed that

the fence erected by Tom Boyer was the correct boundary line that
everyone would live with.

Correspondence between Bennett,

representing Tom Boyer, and Lyle Boyer followed.

Bennett stated

to Lyle the temporary fence was 400 feet too far to the east
-(into section 32) at the north end and 50 feet too far east at
the south end of section 32. Bennett enclosed the Christensen
survey. Lyle Boyer responded that he had tried to locate the
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section line between the two sections. Lyle referred to receiving
the Malan survey and it showed the fence built by Tom Boyer was
the true line.

Lyle stated he believed the Christensen and Malan

surveys both showed the fence put up by Tom Boyer in about 197778 was in the right place. Lyle agreed to maintain the southern
half and Tom would maintain the northern half of that fence, as
Bennett had proposed.

After the October 1985 meeting Bennett

again wrote Lyle and stated concerning the fence Tom built in
1977-78 that "We have now agreed to recognize as the boundary
line between sections 31 and 32 until such a time as the
government authority charged with the responsibility . . . reestablishes those corner markers as between sections 31 and 32 .
. . Until [a further government survey occurs] we agreed to honor
the fence line as described in the enclose document, which was
established by Bing Christensen

. . [and which was agreed to by

Kent/<Wil;de. ]"" The Bennett letter attached a description that was
based somewhat;**x>h th^.;- Christensen survey, .but it did not exactly
trace that map, but began at the southwest corner of section--'31,
then north aj'r.i a fence, then east 5288 feet to the -four-corner
fence 'line made between .sections 29, 30, 31, and.32:.

Lyle- Boyer -

wrote back in early 1966 and stated the existing fence roulc stay
"where."ite "was located and he. would maintain the southern- ,-half .and-./-/
Tom th^ ~ri'\

.

~>lf.

Bennett in June 1986 .asked Lyle to sign

th'e ^agreement and that 'was'never done. _ From all ,of this the
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court finds that there was an agreement but Tom Boyer was not
happy or satisfied about it.

No written agreement was ever

executed and that agreement has no legal significance but informs
the court as to credibility issues.
15. Because of the continuing disagreement, Tom Boyer
commissioned yet another survey, by Green or Alta Surveying, in
2003.

Green's survey, working for ALTA Survey, formed the basis

of later action by Tom Boyer.

Green's survey indicated the

boundary between sections 31 and 32 was approximately 420 feet
west, or into section 31, of where Malan and Christensen had
placed the northern boundary.

That is, the fence running between

sections 29 and 30, where it touched the northern boundary of
sections 31 and 32, was incorrect, and the true boundary was west
420 at the north end and about 50 west at the southern end.

If

the line was where Tom erected the fence in 1977 a spring at the
southern end of the properties was partly m
partly in section 32.

section 31 and

If the Green survey is correct, and the

newly erected 2003 fence reflects the true boundary, that spring
is entirely within section 32. Water rights are not at issue

m

this case.
Based on the Green survey, Tom Boyer removed the fence he
had erected in 1977-78 and erected a new fence along the line
shown as the boundary by Green, that is, about 420 feet to the
west, at the north end, of where the old fence was and about 50
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feet to the west on the southern boundary of the two sections at
issue. When removing the 1977-78 fence its remnants were stored
all on section 32, not on section 31.
16.

Green obtained his surveyor's license in 2000.

explained why he disagreed with the other surveys.

He

The court

realizes its function in this case but the idea that the court
can determine, on the basis of a short trial, what surveying
principles were violated and what were followed is rather
unrealistic.

To the court all surveyors who testified seemed to

be sincere and capable.

It is apparent that surveying is not

"rocket science" in that there is only one correct answer, but
there is some disagreement even amongst experienced surveyors.
Various notes from the past may be interpreted differently,
various landmarks may change, and not all surveys are completely
NX

true" and some are better thin others, just as in any endeavor.
Green explained his proc ^dures and the reasons for his

results. He opined that the common corner of sections 29, 30, 31,
and 32 is where it ±s shown on plaintiff's exhibit 9.

That is,

favoring defendants, or about 420 feet west at the north boundary
of where plaintiff claims the boundary is.
understanding of the "1-'~7^ \
Dublicrr^

h

x

Green explained his

_i of Surveying Instructions

-re o.3. I~r^-~~ l r - °f the Interior.

Green

s surveys, ruz

^Iso wra~

1 fieio notes from

the 1874 U.S. Survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic
map, the acreage involved, as well as other factors.

He

concluded that the 1977-78 fence was not the boundary line but
the boundary line is where the 2003 fence was erected by Tom
Boyer after the Green survey.

The original plat of 1874 shows

section 31 is "short" and consists of 623.6 acres and section 32
consists of 640 acres.
Green had done another survey in the area, for a person
named Henrie, in 2001.

Henrie was interested m

purchasing

section 28 and some of section 33, and so Green obtained
documents and information from neighboring land owners, including
Tom Boyer, to conduct that survey. Green also obtained a title
company title report which was suppose to contain the public
documents. Later in 2003, after Tom Boyer heard of Green and his
2001 survey, Tom Boyer asked Green to establish the boundary
between sections 31 and 32.

Green later concluded, after talking

to some of the surveyors of plaintiff, that they were wrong and
he was right.

Green opined that plaintiff's surveyors had simply

accepted the "stone" they found without "testing" it against
other information, as Green did.

Thus, Green op±ned as he did.

Green filed a survey for Henrie, and it varies m

some

regards from the Tom Boyer survey of 2003, which was filed in
2004 witu trie •> ^ ~ iar. (There is no Summit County surveyor, so
surveys are filed with the county recorder.)
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Green explained the

2001 Henrie survey was not "wrong" but was accurate based on the
information, and with the later filing of the 2003 survey, any
interested person could see what Green had done because of his
narrative description on those two surveys.

A great deal of

testimony was elicited about the 2001 survey.
17. Various persons had been to the disputed area over the
years.

Many had seen, and the court finds, that indeed there was

a government u stone" or monument placed there by the 1874 survey,
which was intended as the common corner between sections 29, 30,
31, and 32.

That was not shown on the 1967 or 1997 topographic

map, but various individuals who were not interested directly
the dispute saw the stone.

m

That stone would not show up on a

government topographic map unLess it was observed by a government
employee tasked to find such markers. The Malan survey described
the stone and his son Kent testified he saw it.
survey noted a stone at the same location.

The Christensen

WiJde himself had

seen ±t several times and it was notched and marked as a
government-placed stone.

Wilde saw it m

but it was not th^re ^_n 2003.

197^ and agaii ^i 1985,

Wilde and Lyle Boyer had been to

the corner with a view to staking a fence line south of that
boundary.

Ly^e h^ied a contiactor, Fort_n, to "push" ci c^ear

the path for a fence.

Hortm saw and described the stone, as did

a neighbor who maintained the fences of another section H a l
adjoined the corner of 29, 20, 31, and 32.

Those persons all

described the stone a bit differently but as being in the same
location as the four corner fence area, where the 1977-78 fence
was erected going south. Tom Boyer testified he did not see such
a stone ever, nor did his son Jeremy. Tom went to the site with
Malan, Christensen, and at other times. The court credits the
testimony of Wilde and others more than Tom Boyer concerning this
government stone and its location.

The description of the stone

convinces the court not that they are wrong, but that they are
being honest.

The court does not indicate or imply Tom Boyer

caused the removal of the stone, but the court credits the
testimony of the many persons who saw the stone at the point
where the Malan and Christensen surveys indicate it was.

That

is, where the fence line coming from the north between sections
29 and 30 joins the northern boundary of sections 31 and 32, or
where the 1977-78 fence was erected by Tom Boyer.
18. The court finds from its own common sense as well as the
expert testimony elicited, that the field notes from 1874 were
not completely accurate as to what are called the topographic
calls.

The topographic map shows, for example, a ridge or gulch

or stream, and the field notes from 1874 indicate those were in
different places ^^^

v hit

the topographic map shows.

The

survey's field notes from 1874 would say, for example, that from
point A it was "X chains (cor erted into ^eet ai o ir
"ridge."

^

to a

Of course just where a ridge begins and ends is hard to
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determine, and that is obviously true of a gulch, a stream, or
tree line.

Those latter two features can and obviously may well

change in 130 years from 1874 to 2003. The notes, again, show
reference to a line of trees, or a gulch, or ridge, or stream,
and of course natural changes occur in those over 130 years.

The

notes are found by the court to be inaccurate as to distances and
thus the corners which were established by following those notes
as Green did were inaccurate.

Often the distances were off as

much as 500 feet, which would and does account for the
discrepancy Green states he found.

Because the field notes were

incorrect as plaintiff's expert opined, Green's reliance on them
caused his final conclusion to be incorrect.
19. The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was
not persuasive.

The cost to resurvey was not shown, and based on

plaintiff's position the court cannot see why another survey
would have been helpful or would now be helpful.

The evidence as

to the cost to tear town the 2003 fence was some indication of
damages, but the cost to erect a range fence was not compelling
such that the court can find those costs are any measure of
damages.

It was not shown why any new clearing must take place,

as when the 1977-78 fence ^as taken down in 2003, there st:1_
remains, as shown j^ pno-ograj-hs, an area somewhat clear where a
lhat 19^7-78 fence line is not
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would be accurate.

The bids to again N'clear" that already

reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic.

As to the

alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees
or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what
was removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees
were moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many
nor the value of those.

Moreover, it was not shown why indeed

concerning this range land there needs to be any remediation as
evidently over the many years this land has been m

the Boyer

family there has never been any such reforesting or replanting of
grasses.

The damages must be proven, though of course they need

not be with specificity.

They may not be the subject of

conjecture, and the court believes the estimates provided are
just that-conjecture. The costs for halting erosion or the spread
of weeds appears to be the subject of government regulation, but
it was not shown that moving the 2003 fence back to the 1977-78
fence location would cause any erosion or weed problems that must
be budgeted for 10 years.

Moreover, this being rangeland it is

not clear to the court that any such costs are legitimate m

any

fashion.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court mdros1
the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The conflicting surveys are based on a number of
principles the court need not examine and discuss fully.

As

found above, surveying is not as exact as the court and perhaps
others believed.
data and evidence.

It is subject to varying interpretations of
A key principle involved is that a government

stone, or monument, is said to be unchangeable after title passes
from the United States.

Right or wrong, if the monument in

placed by the United States, it remains and boundaries are drawn
from it. If that stone is the same stone and in the same place as
originally placed, that is indeed to be interpreted as the corner
of a section.

Other information can be used to corroborate and

test its validity but it is a key m

determining section

boundaries. This stone, found by the court to exist m

the place

Kent Wilde (and others) described, was marked appropriately to
show its place within the township, with 5 chiseled notches on
the east and one on the south.
section within the township.
western most section m

That shows the place of the
S-ection 31 is the southern and

the township, which contains 36 sections.

If the positioning of a stone is questionable, it may be
supported oy fxnairg eT7ider :e relating t^ othei known corners,
examination of the field notes relating to natutal objects, and
unquestionable testimory. Trie testimony of interested lo^aownex s
and competent surveyors and other qualified witnesses ±^ to le

weighed.

The court has done just that.

2. The court concludes that the government stone was
observed before 1985 and in 1985.

Its authenticity cannot

reasonably be questioned. Defendant's evidence was the direct
testimony of Tom Boyer that he had looked for a monument and had
failed to find it, spending perhaps 30 hours in so doing.

The

other witnesses for defendant, William Boyer through his
deposition and a letter from Lyle Boyer, are found to be less
convincing than the witnesses who testified they actually saw the
stone.

There is certainly a conflict whether the stone was at a

common boundary, but on balance the court concludes it was.

The

testimony of Kent Wilde is particularly telling and informative.
While legally insignificant, Tom Boyer's testimony about an
October 1985 meeting is some influence to the court.

Several

persons were there and presented testimony that after Tom Boyer
erected the fence in 1977-78, he still disputed its position as
being correct, so he asked for a meeting.

Of all the people who

attended, everyone including his attorney indicated there was an
agreement that the fence would remain where Tom Boyer had erected
it and the fence would be the boundary.
language m

There is certainly some

the correspondence indicating some conflicts, but the

court has found there was an agreement. Again, that is not of any
legal significance as to the boundary but to the court it deals
with credibility in that Tom Boyer then, many years later,
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commissioned yet another survey and ultimately changed the fence.
That shows the court Tom Boyer was not as credible as others who
testified about the stone. When Green conducted his survey in
2003 he gave weight to that evidence of a stone being found and
observed by others, but Green gave it insufficient weight in the
court's view.

Rather, Green relied on his interpretation of the

field notes and topographic calls from the 1874 survey, and he
came within a range rather than at an exact point even at that.
Further, there were fences and fence posts observed and placed by
others, surveys from the past, and evidence from others who saw
the stone.

While Green did consider those things, he considered

other evidences as being more important, and to the court that is
the principal reason the court rejects his survey as showing the
true boundary. The Green survey was not nearly as faulty as
plaintiff alleges, however.

Green simply disagreed with others

and gave insufficient weight to the government stone and evidence
that supported the presence of that stone, and he gave increased
weight to his own "retracing" efforts and relied too heavily on
questionable fieJd notes over the government stone.

Green did

not see the stone in 2001 or 2003, but he had evidence from other
competent sur/cy^s m

had been in place and he had possession of

certified surveys so showing.

The court does not believe Green

failed to obtain sufficient information from Terr ocyer as Green
had public documents through the title report, though both the
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title report and Green failed to discover the 1985 Christensen
survey which was of record and had been recorded by Vern Boyer in
1980.

Green had no reason to contact Kent Wilde as Wilde had not

filed a survey of this area.

Green did not but certainly should

have contacted adjacent landowners including plaintiff, but Green
did have, as noted, the field notes from the 1874 survey and his
task was to retrace that survey.

He had the topographic map from

1967 and there was no stone shown on that map, nor was there a
stone located at the site in 2003.

Green did not file an

amendment to the 2001 Henrie survey, but the later 2003 survey
and the narratives involved make clear that in practical effect
the 2003 survey was an amendment to the 2001 survey.

Green thus

did not completely fail to follow standard principals to any
degree approaching plaintiff's claims of wilfulness or
professional incompetence. Green's survey, while the court
concludes it was not sufficiently based on clear and available
evidence of a section corner monument, was not done in wilful
disregard of standard principles of surveying.

It was merely

wrong and based on other evidences Green felt more important than
the government monument evidence.

Indeed, survey principles do

not call for a "blind" adherence to a government monument if that
monument is too questionable according to all evidence.

However,

as the court understands it, Green used the 1874 field notes ana
examined terrain and topography and naturally occurring sians.
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Certainly those would change to some extent in 130 years. The
process Green followed is indeed not dissimilar to what the court
is now undertaking in this and any other case.

An examination of

all evidence is made and a conclusion is reached.

Green did that

though in a way that others did not agree with and that this
court does not agree with, in that the key evidence, the
government stone, was not properly weighed by Green.

This court

does not agree with Green's result, or conclusion, but the
process he engaged in was not so flawed as to be without some
merit and it was certainly not wilfully incorrect. The Green
survey was not

done outside the standards of the profession, it

is merely found to be incorrect based on the key finding that the
government: monument was not sufficiently recognized or weighed by
Green.
3. Because Green's survey is not correct, the court
concludes that the true boundary line between sections 31 and 32
at the north end of those sections is where it was shown on the
Malan and Christensen surveys, where Wilde and many others saw
the government stone, where the 1977-78 fence was erected. Tne
boundary line then proceeds southerly and westerly to the point
at the south end of sections 31 and 32 which is not disputed and
shown on all surveys, including Green's.

That is the true

boundary and title is quieted in each 3ection to that boundary
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4. The conveyance deeds indeed were intended to convey
certain properties to the heirs of Joseph and Lois Boyer. There
were six children involved, including Vern and Lyle, five sons
and one daughter.

The court concludes, from all the evidence,

that the conveyance deeds were not unambiguous and extrinsic
evidence was thus allowed. The deeds were ambiguous because the
deeds stated a specific legal description (section 31 or 32) PLUS
an acreage amount. The deed to Lyle stated US Survey.

The deed

to Vern did not. Those create an ambiguity. The court finds and
concludes that the intent of Joseph and Lois is what the court
must determine, as the co-executors were then to continue to
execute that intent and convey what Joseph and Lois intended.
From examining the probate documents in evidence, as well as the
deposition of William Boyer, the executor who executed the deeds
concerning these sections, and considering all the extrinsic
evidence, the court concludes that it was the intent of Joseph
and Lois Boyer, to convey section 31, whatever that section was
according to the U.S. Survey, to Lyle Boyer.

Similarly, it was

the intent of Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey all of section 32,
whatever that was according to the U.S. Survey, to Vern Boyer.
There was not any evidence that clearly and unequivocally shows
an intent by Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey any set amount of
land.

These sections conveyed were only part of the land

conveyed by the executor's deeds, which conveyed other property
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to Vern and Lyle.

It was not shown clearly by the documents or

the evidence that Joseph and Lois intended to convey a certain
amount of acreage, 640 acres in the case of section 32 and 623.6
acres in the case of section 31.

Joseph and Lois Boyer intended

each of their children to benefit equally.
as tenants in common.
estate.

All property was held

Each offspring was to receive 1/6 of the

The acreage stated, "more or less," in the documents,

and that acreage was taken from that 1874 U.S. Survey map.
Whether section 31 was in fact comprised of 623.6 acres or not,,
the survey was the key factor in determining what the section
consisted of and it was the overall intent that section 31 be
conveyed to Lyle and section 32 to Vern. The acreage is found to
be secondary to the primary intent to convey the sections
involved to Lyle or Vern.

The U.S. Survey, as concluded above,

was based on the corner stone placed in 1874 and found to have
existed where plaintiff claims it was.

Thus, the true boundary.

lineo.at the. north boundary begins where, the .stone .was observed to
be, or at what is'called by 'defendant as Judd's corner.
5. Plaintiff has not proven damages as claimed.

The cost of

removing the :f'drice -erected in 2003 was not shown convincingly,
nor was any need for remediatipn ,:shpwn. convincingly.

The

evidence -presented' was- f.d'o ^pecuLative'.and not based-on
;

;'

* fouroiar: on such thso: i o ccnvinces the court that there
any -::;.;:or. or weed control, cr that a range fence or

any other fence w o u l d
evidence showed.

cost anywhere near what

plaintiff's

The court rejects all the t e s t i m o n y

about

damages and c o n c l u d e s that p l a i n t i f f has not p r o v e n any
resulting

from the r e m o v a l of the 1977-78

of the 2003

fence or the

resolve.

erection

fence.

6. The claim of b a d faith as to Green has b e e n
rejected.

damages

The c l a i m of bad faith as to T o m Boyer

fully

is harder to

C e r t a i n l y Tom B o y e r would argue that he acted,

taking d o w n the 1977-78

fence and e r e c t i n g the 2 0 0 3 f e n c e , that

he acted on the b a s i s of a l e g i t i m a t e l y
That is c e r t a i n l y t r u e .

m

commissioned

survey.

H o w e v e r , the p a u s e the c o u r t engages

is to ask i t s e l f w h y T o m B o y e r felt any need to c o m m i s s i o n
2003 survey.

He h a d a s k e d M a l a n and C h r i s t e n s e n t o do a

in

the

survey

and they did so, e a c h c e r t i f y i n g the b o u n d a r y line at a p l a c e
where p l a i n t i f f

c l a i m s it to b e .

the situation m

the October

He agreed to o t h e r s that

1985 m e e t i n g .

He still could

seem to leave i t , h o w e v e r , for some r e a s o n , and so had
another survey c o n d u c t w o r k .

That is the d i f f i c u l t point

Tom B o y e r , after having the G r e e n survey, did

explain w h a t he w a s doing or why.
It c e r t a i n l y

would so b e h a v e .

the

even

not even a p p r o a c h h i s a u n t , p l a i n t i f f , an e l d e r l y w o m a n ,

fence.

not

still

court s t r u g g l e s w i t h , w h y , based on w h a t , did Tom B o y e r
commission G r e e n .

was

He m e r e l y a c t e d

is u n e x p l a m a b l e

and

and m o v e d a

to the court why

someone

W h a t e v e r p a s t disputes had e x i s t e d b e t w e e n Vern
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and Lyle could have and should have been forgotten long ago. Both
were deceased.

Tom Boyer, for whatever reason, continued to

press the matter and asked for yet another survey.

If such

conduct is not in bad faith, it is certainly mystifying to the
court.

Tom Boyer seemed, however, to the court to be a sensible

person in other areas of his life.

Based on a consideration of

all factors, many no doubt unknown to the court, the court cannot
find his actions in bad faith.
7. Defendants' position as to the boundary, after the 2003
Green survey, is definitely not in bad faith and without support.
No fees should be awarded to either party. There has been no
wilful conduct and punitive damages are not awarded.
8. Plaintiff has shown title to the land up to the boundary
as found herein.

Thus, plaintiff's causes of action for tortious

conduct has been shown, but no damages have been proven.

The

court declares the boundary between sections 31 and 32 to be as
•hereirv-described and quiets title accordingly.:
be removed'as indicated'below.'

The ,fence'; 'should

No damages ar:e\ awarded" and of

course no punitive damages.
9. The 'court believes it probably cannot force this-"result
or force any co^pei "~t: -r: b\:t be] iev'j;. iha.t v/hat, makes .sense, in : •'this -ca;se'' is-' for/.the existing 2003 fence to joe r el ocated to; iheunHpr*/

"

' herein.

It is a quality fence, lasting .and
Rather 'than have -it torniSSi|i7 • newv
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materials purchased and a new "range" fence erected (which fence
would require far more maintenance and possibly engender further
disputes) it seems a practical solution for defendant to move the
existing 2003 fence onto the new boundary.

Plaintiff is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.

r>

DATED this

day of

s

, 2006,

BYTOJtfCOURTX

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT

-26-

%M& 1 R

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 04050042 9 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this J~VA day of

F)fi_h>h?.r-

P, a e , , i M t )

NAME
BRETT D CRAGUN
ATTORNEY PLA
3098 HIGHLAND DR STE 450
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106
RAY G MARTINEAU
ATTORNEY PLA
3098 HIGHLAND DR STE 450
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106
ROBERT H WILDE
ATTORNEY DEF
935 E S UNION AVE STE D-102
MIDVALE UT 84 04 7
20Oy

.

WW"

